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Abstract 
Drivers are required to monitor multiple critical variables in a dynamic, uncertain environment. Increasingly automated vehicles 
relieve drivers of the demand of moment-to-moment control but impose attentional demands associated with the need to monitor 
the status and behavior of the automation. Adaptive cruise control (ACC) is such a system – it automates headway maintenance. 
Because ACC operates effectively in only a subset of driving situations, drivers must monitor the system and intervene 
periodically. This paper describes a computational model to assess driver-ACC interaction. In this model, the driver is modeled 
according to a set of state transition diagrams (applying the modeling formalism developed by Degani & Heymann, 2002, 2007), 
which represent a driver’s mental model (i.e., understanding) of ACC as developed through its interface. This mental model 
combines with a set of response rules, based on perceptual thresholds, which guide driver response in failure situations. The ACC 
is modeled as a two-level longitudinal control algorithm (Zheng & McDonald, 2005). The interaction of the driver and ACC 
predict reaction times for drivers intervening during ACC failures. The model predicts collision outcomes for a set of ACC use 
cases, which include scenarios within and outside normal ACC operating conditions. As identified from the model, there are a 
number of situations in which drivers’ inadequate understanding of ACC result in collisions. The findings indicate the need to 
inform drivers of ACC behavior in a way that allows them to anticipate situations prone to system failure, i.e., as based on an 
adequate understanding of system boundary conditions and appropriate situations of use. Implications of computational models 
for assessing driver-automation interaction for higher levels of automation are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
Drivers must monitor multiple critical variables in a dynamic, uncertain environment. They need to predict how 
these variables change to know how to adapt their behaviour to effectively interact with automated systems. An 
important concern is how drivers manage their attention to automated systems and to the driving task.  
Technology that automates vehicle control relieves drivers of the demand of moment-to-moment control but 
imposes attentional demands associated with the need to monitor the status and behaviour of the automation [1]. 
Adaptive cruise control (ACC) is such a system – it automates headway maintenance. Because ACC operates 
effectively in only a subset of driving situations, drivers must monitor the system and intervene periodically. Sensors 
positioned on the front of the vehicle detect preceding vehicles and determine their range and speed. If no vehicle is 
detected, the ACC operates like a conventional cruise control system, maintaining a set speed. If a preceding vehicle 
is detected, the ACC modulates vehicle speed to maintain a preset time headway. Typically, ACC operates only for 
a limited range of speeds and braking authority is limited to less than 0.3 g.  
The dynamics of driving and ACC features combine to surprise drivers. Such surprises are often a product of 
inadequate driver understanding of ACC behaviour and limits. Situations that can lead to surprises include drivers: 
1) trusting the ACC more than warranted, 2) engaging the system in situations beyond its original design parameters, 
and 3) failing to recognize when the system is behaving in ways that are contrary to their expectations [2, 3]. Nilsson 
[4] introduced drivers to three critical scenarios that required driver intervention. These scenarios were approaching 
a stationary queue of traffic, a car pulling out in front of the driver’s vehicle, and a hard braking lead vehicle. 
Drivers over-relied on the ACC and delayed their response when confronted with the first scenario, resulting in near 
collisions. Rudin-Brown and Parker [2] observed similar decrements to hazard response with use of ACC; drivers 
maintained high levels of trust in the hazard situation and performed better in a secondary task, indicating that they 
over-trusted and over-relied on the ACC. Hoedemaeker [5] showed that drivers failed to recognize the limitations of 
the ACC for overtaking manoeuvres on rural roads and in detecting traffic coming from the right at an intersection. 
Stanton, Young, & McCaulder [3] showed ACC surprises also occur when sensors either do not detect targets in the 
path of the vehicle (e.g., motorcycle) or respond to non-vehicle targets (e.g., bicyclist or pedestrian). These studies 
show the need for drivers to understand the limits of ACC and when they must disengage the system. The feedback 
available from current ACC systems is often inadequate to help drivers develop appropriate mental models that will 
enable them to understand its limitations, and to predict ACC behaviour [3, 6, 7].  
This paper presents a modelling analysis intended to develop a deeper understanding of the driver-ACC 
algorithm interaction. This analysis is expected to reveal situations in which a driver’s inadequate understanding of 
the ACC’s function and operating capabilities will increase collision likelihood. Such situations indicate the need to 
properly inform drivers of the ACC’s behaviour. The analyses included in this paper address the following question: 
If ACC fails temporarily, what is the consequence to driving safety and how will a driver respond as a function of 
their understanding? 
1.1. Modelling approach 
Following the modelling formalism developed by Degani and Heymann [8, 9], we model driver-ACC interaction 
with state transition diagrams. These diagrams represent drivers’ mental model (i.e., understanding) of ACC, as 
developed through its interface and its response to roadway events. These diagrams combine with a set of response 
rules, based on perceptual thresholds, to predict driver response in failure situations. The ACC is modelled using a 
two-level longitudinal control algorithm [10]. 
1.2. Driver component  
Drivers’ mental models of automation are a function of a system’s purpose and form, its operating procedures, 
and associated state structure [11, 12]. Mental models are constructed from information provided by the interface, 
observed system behaviour, and instructions [13]. These mental models guide attention allocation [1], directing 
operators where and when to look for information regarding the automation and the system being controlled [14, 
15]. Because a mental model represents understanding, shaping operator prediction of automation behaviour and 
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control responses [14, 16], compatibility must exist between the physical system itself, the mental model, and the 
interface between the two. Degani and Heymann [8, 9] developed a formal approach to describe human-automation 
interaction. In their work, state transition diagrams model the internal configuration of automation and the state 
changes that occur in response to events that trigger them. As an operator interacts with automation through an 
interface by observing and triggering state transitions, the operator forms a model. Essentially, the information 
provided within an interface defines the driver’s mental model.  
State transition model of ACC. Fig. 1a depicts a state transition model of ACC. This model includes four states: 
speed control, distance (or following) control, off, and standby. The transitions to and from these states, which 
represent discrete state changes, are triggered either by the driver (depicted in Fig. 1 as dashed lines) or 
automatically (depicted in Fig. 1 by solid lines). Fig. 1b shows the detailed view of the states and transitions internal 
to the ‘ACC active’ state. Transition lines in Fig. 1a and b are labelled by the event that triggers the state change. 
The state transition models in Fig. 1 are consistent with the ISO standard for performance requirements and test 
procedures for Adaptive Cruise Control Systems [17].  
 
Fig. 1. (a) ACC states and transitions. Dashed lines represent driver-triggered transitions, solid lines - ACC-triggered transitions; (b) detailed 
states and transitions within ‘ACC speed control; and ‘ACC distance control’. 
Automation interfaces present abstracted information concerning the underlying automation state, structure, and 
response; they represent the automation to the operator. It is therefore important that an interface captures the 
automation’s behaviour adequately. When the model of automation conveyed by the interface differs from the actual 
state of the automation, breakdowns in human-automation interaction can occur. The ISO standard for ACC systems 
is to provide drivers at a minimum an indication of the ACC’s activation state (ACC system is active, not active, or 
off), and set speed. One such an interface is a display of set speed that is only visible when ACC is active. Drivers 
are also to be informed if the ACC system is not available due to a failure. An example driver model of the ACC 
system derived from use of the controls and through an interface containing the ISO-specified feedback is shown in 
Fig. 2a. This model illustrates the disparity that can occur from an over-simplification of the actual complexity of 
the ‘ACC active state’ in the information provided in the ACC interface. A visual comparison of the ACC system 
model (Fig. 1) and the driver model (Fig. 2a) indicates that there are a number of unobserved events. Unobserved 
events are those that are not displayed in the interface and consequently not represented in the operator model [8, 9]. 
Unobserved ACC events include: sensor limits, braking algorithm limits, and most of the transitions between follow 
and resume modes internal to ‘ACC active’. Without such information, drivers are likely to develop inaccurate 
mental models [18].  
Composite state transition model. A composite model reveals inconsistencies of the driver model to that of the 
system model [8, 9]. To create a composite model, the driver model states and ACC model states are combined into 
state pairs. If these state pairs are inconsistent, i.e., the driver’s model indicates that ACC is in a state that does not  
b a 
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Fig. 2. (a) driver model of ACC; (b) composite of the driver model (black boxes) and ACC system model (white boxes). Error states are indicated 
with a vertical hashed border. 
match the actual state of the ACC, there is an inaccuracy in the driver’s model, referred to as an error state. Error 
states in Fig. 2b are indicated with a vertical hashed border. The ‘ACC not active – ACC off’ and ‘ACC off – ACC 
standby’ error states result because the interface does not differentiate between standby and off states. The ‘ACC 
active – ACC standby’ error state results from missing feedback on the conditions that automatically deactivate the 
ACC system.  
To communicate the ACC system model and to inform drivers of the ACC’s behaviour, an ACC interface should 
indicate set speed, current speed, set headway, current headway, ACC activation (on, off, active, standby), if the LV 
is detected, and the events/conditions that trigger transitions, i.e., the boundary of the ACC operating conditions. An 
inaccurate mental model, with missing transitions between states or missing states, leads drivers to incorrect 
expectations regarding the behaviour of the ACC.  
Control response thresholds. The lower bound for a driver’s control response (i.e., disengaging ACC) in response 
to an ACC failure (operationally defined as a loss of ACC’s set following distance) is at the point where an event is 
first perceptible – a just-noticeable difference (JND). Essentially, such a response occurs provided the perception of 
a change in a particular variable. For dynamic visual objects, the JND is based on the visual angle subtended by the 
object at the eye of the following driver (θ) and the rate of change of this visual angle (dθ/dt). These quantities are 
defined, according to Hoffman and Mortimer [19], as: 
 θ = W/H           (1) 
 dθ/dt = = WVr/H2          (2) 
where W is the width of the object, Vr  is the relative velocity between the driver’s vehicle and the object (where 
“object”, as applied in this context, refers to a lead vehicle) and H is the distance between the following driver’s eye 
and the rear of the object. The visual angle and the angular velocity subtended by the observed object are perceptible 
above the thresholds of approximately 0.017 degrees [20] and 0.17 degrees/second [19], respectively. 
In driving, visual angle and expansion rate are effective information sources for detecting deceleration of a lead 
vehicle only when they exceed these thresholds. The perceptual system is flexibly attuned to specific properties of 
the task environment in response to a looming event or stimulus, whereby angle and expansion rate strategies are 
used effectively either alone or in combination as perceptual response thresholds [21]. Importantly, simply 
perceiving a lead vehicle or perceiving that it is slowing might not provoke a response. Another type of response 
threshold pertinent to driving is that of a threat threshold. Time-to-collision (TTC) is often applied as a safety 
indicator for longitudinal control using a determined minimum TTC, e.g., [22, 23].  
T
a b 
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TTC = R / (Vdriver’s vehicle – Vlead vehicle)        (3) 
where R indicates range from the driver’s vehicle to the lead vehicle. TTC indicates collision potential, being 
inversely related to accident risk (higher TTC values indicate a higher accident risk and vice versa). A minimum 
TTC of 4 seconds is often cited as the boundary discriminating instances in which drivers unintentionally find 
themselves in a dangerous situation and those in which they remain in control [24].  
The value of the response threshold at which a driver will initiate a control response depends on response 
strategy, which depends on the driver’s mental model of the ACC. For instance, a driver with an inaccurate mental 
model is likely to initiate a control response based on their JND of a driving event that signals an ACC failure (e.g., 
a looming lead vehicle) rather than on their understanding of how a particular change in driving condition affects 
ACC performance. The use of response thresholds with values for which drivers initiate a response allows the model 
to predict driver behaviour. 
1.3. ACC component 
The control aspects of ACC that determines its response behaviour (to trigger state transitions) are briefly 
described in this section. The longitudinal control model from Zheng and McDonald [10] was adopted to simulate 
ACC behavior: 
 =     (4) 
where  is the rate of change of acceleration of the LV as a function of time. Based on the results from Zheng 
and McDonald [10], Kv and Kd are set to 0.75 and 0.1, respectively. The time headway (Th) is set to 1.5s. The 
maximum acceleration of the ACC system is 0.2g. 
1.4. Model outputs 
The model generates driver reaction time to failures of the ACC system to maintain the set THW, and a 
composite model profile, which indicates mismatches between the state changes tracked by the driver and state 
changes of the ACC. The model also generates velocities and relative positions of the lead vehicle and the driver’s 
vehicle for the duration of a driving event, allowing for calculation of collision frequency and other driving 
performance metrics.  
2. Method 
The model used for these analyses was developed using Simulink 6.0 and Stateflow, 6.0, as part of MATLAB 7.0 
(Mathworks Inc., Natick, MA). All parameters relating to the driver component and ACC component were 
controllable. The driver model and system model of ACC were implemented using Stateflow. The control law for 
ACC (formula 4) was implemented using Simulink. Initial scenario conditions were input into the ACC component, 
which output an acceleration profile for the driver vehicle. This profile and scenario parameters were input into the 
driver model and system model to dynamically transition through their respective states and transitions. Driver 
reaction time to ACC failure events were calculated from the point of failure to the control response, as initiated 
dependent on the particular response strategy. The independent variables examined in this study were event type, 
driver model, and control response.  The purpose of the driver-ACC interaction analysis is to reveal how interface 
design and driving conditions lead to driver-ACC interaction failures.  
Each event type is characterized by lead vehicle (LV) acceleration, LV velocity, driver vehicle (DV) velocity, 
initial time headway (THW) to LV, initial range rate to LV, set velocity, and an ACC sensor operation profile (see 
Table 1). The event conditions resulted in differing ACC response behaviours at failure: 1-second maximum 
deceleration followed with transition to standby, acceleration to set velocity within active state, and immediate 
transition to standby for braking, sensing, and setting failures, respectively. In their unique behavioural implications 
to ACC, these event conditions test the specificity of a driver’s mental model. Further, they represent the situational 
LVx    > @LVLVhLVDVdLVDVv xxTxxKxxK   *1W
LVx
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factors and vehicle dynamics reported in the literature as problematic to drivers in use of ACC (e.g., degraded 
sensors: [3]; braking limit exceedances: [4]; offset LV outside sensor field: [3]; lateral incursion of a LV not 
detected by sensor field: [10]; set velocity deviant from LV velocity: [5]). For all event types, the initial conditions 
describe a following situation with a 1.5 s THW at equal velocity. LV deceleration rate and duration, sensor failure 
time, and velocity difference to set speed are varied for the braking, sensing, and setting event types, respectively. 
Two driver models of ACC were implemented in Stateflow for the driver component of the interaction model: 1) 
an inaccurate driver model as predicted to result from a standard ACC interface (consistent with Fig. 1); and 2) an 
accurate driver model as predicted to result from an ACC interface that informed drivers of its activation state, 
settings, and operating limits. 
Five control response thresholds were tested: 1) no response (a control condition); 2) JND of expansion rate; 3) 
TTC = 4 s; 4) state change from inaccurate model; 5) state change from accurate model. To more accurately model 
driver response time to ACC failures, a 1.5 s time delay was added to each control response calculation of reaction 
time to account for cognitive processing and movement time to initiate a brake response [25]. The driver–ACC 
interaction model generated driver reaction time to ACC failure (mean; standard deviation) and collision outcome. 
Table 1. Event inputs to model of driver-ACC interaction. 
Driving Event Type Description of Driving, Initial Conditions, and ACC Response Number of Conditions 
Braking limit exceedence THWo = 1.5 s; RRo = 0.0 m;         dLV = 0.0 : 0.01 : 0.85 g 
Set Vo = 24.59 m/s [55 mph]       Tdecel = 0 : 0.1 : 10 s 
DV Vo = 22.35 m/s [50 mph]      TF = 0 s 
LV Vo = 22.35 m/s [50 mph]       Individual condition run time: 60 s (at 60 Hz) 
 
8,686 
Degraded sensor / Lateral 
range limit exceedence 
THWo = 1.5 s; RRo = 0.0 m;         dLV = 0.0 : 0.01 : 0.85 g 
Set Vo = 24.59 m/s [55 mph]       Tdecel = 0 : 0.1 : 10 s 
DV Vo = 22.35 m/s [50 mph]      TF = 1, 5, 10 s 
LV Vo = 22.35 m/s [50 mph]       Individual condition run time: 60 s (at 60 Hz) 
 
26,058 
Minimum velocity setting 
exceedence 
THWo = 1.5 s; RRo = 0.0 m;         dLV = 0.0 : 0.01 : 0.85 g 
Set Vo = 13.41 m/s [30 mph]       Tdecel = 0 : 0.1 : 10 s 
DV Vo = 13.41 m/s [30 mph]      TF = 0 s 
LV Vo = 13.41 m/s [30 mph]       Individual condition run time: 60 s (at 60 Hz) 
8,686 
THW = time headway; RR = range rate; DV = driver’s vehicle; LV = lead vehicle; Vo = initial velocity; dLV = deceleration rate of LV;  
Tdecel = time of LV deceleration; TF = Sensor failure time; aACC = acceleration response of ACC.  
Note: Numbers nested between two numbers with colons on either side are the step sizes 
3. Results 
The total number of event conditions produced from the initial conditions listed in Table 2 was 43,430. A driver 
reaction time was calculated for each of these initial conditions for each of the five control responses. Table 2 
summarizes these statistics by event type and control response. These results are discussed in response to the 
analysis question posed in the Introduction: If ACC fails temporarily, what is the consequence to driving safety and 
how will a driver respond as a function of their understanding? 
Table 2. Summary of model findings. 
Collisions No Response Expansion Rate TTC=4 Inaccurate Model Accurate Model 
Braking 0.54 0.527 0.183 0.463 0 
Sensing 1 0.591 0.578 0.181 0 0 
Sensing 5 0.785 0.768 0.366 0 0 
Sensing 10 0.903 0.889 0.366 0 0 
Settings 0.636 0.603 0.162 0.472 0 
Mean RT      
Braking - 7.024 3.967 4.524 3.063 
Sensing 1 - 6.649 3.603 1.928 0.428 
Sensing 5 - 7.565 3.744 2.001 0.501 
Mean RT      
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Sensing 10 - 10.973 4.59 2.001 0.501 
Settings - 5.856 3.717 3.633 2.438 
Standard Deviation of RT      
Braking - 0.231 0.03 0.049 0.125 
Sensing 1 - 0.247 0.015 0 0 
Sensing 5 - 0.314 0.361 0.014 0.014 
Sensing 10 - 0.3 0.55 0.014 0.014 
Settings - 0.24 0.007 0.267 0.134 
  
For each event type, the ‘No Response’ column in Table 2 lists the percent of conditions that result in a collision 
(‘Sensing 1’, ‘Sensing 5’, and ‘Sensing 10’ denote the duration of the sensor failure in seconds). From these 
findings, it is evident that ACC cannot respond to many LV following situations. The braking capabilities of ACC 
can accommodate only half of the high-velocity LV braking events. As the sensor failure durations increase, 
collisions become inevitable for many LV braking events. The prevalence of situations in which ACC’s limits are 
exceeded indicates the need for drivers to remain vigilant to its moment-to-moment state and behaviour. Drivers 
who rely on their perceptual abilities to detect and respond to failures of ACC are likely to over-estimate its ability 
to operate within its limits. A TTC=4 response threshold resulted in the fastest reaction times across event types and 
consequent lowest number of collision situations. Numerous event conditions still exceeded drivers’ ability to 
respond safely when the model relies on this threat boundary as a threshold for when to initiate a control response. 
For the inaccurate driver model, control responses were initiated at the point of ACC’s state change from ‘On’ to 
‘Standby’ when braking and setting limits were exceeded. In this model, it is assumed that drivers would receive 
discrete warnings to indicate braking and setting limits; notably though, they would not prevent collisions in all 
situations. In fact, initiating control responses based on TTC is a better response strategy than relying on warnings 
that notify of limit exceedences, resulting in faster RTs and consequent fewer collisions. For situations when drivers 
are notified of ACC’s sensing limits (the ‘Sensing’ rows in the ‘Inaccurate Model’ column in Table 2), drivers are 
able to avoid collisions. For the inaccurate driver model, however, drivers were unaware of ACC’s sensing limits, 
and therefore remained in the ‘On’ state during the sensing failures. Drivers are expected to remain in this state until 
either a perceptual or threat threshold is crossed alerting them to their incorrect expectation of ACC’s state. The 
‘Accurate Model’ column in Table 2 lists the predicted RTs and consequent collision outcomes that result with use 
of an accurate model. Such a model would require an interface that primes drivers to the conditions that lead to ACC 
failure. For all tested event conditions, an ‘Accurate’ model prompted control responses that avoided collision. 
4. Discussion 
The analysis indicated that ACC failures that occur during normal use of the system in common driving situations 
could result in crashes. Because of the limited time to respond to ACC failures, it is important for drivers to 
understand the ACC and intervene prior to its failure. A response strategy of braking when TTC exceeds 4.0 
seconds, initiated after a failure, often fails to avoid collisions. Drivers who rely on their perceptual capabilities and 
fail to develop accurate models of the ACC are at risk for collision. Drivers must anticipate situations that will lead 
to failure based on an adequate understanding of how the ACC interacts with the driving environment. 
In-vehicle support displays or training on ACC function and operating capabilities help build adequate driver 
understanding of ACC [26]. Examples of support displays are warnings that indicate when the ACC’s capabilities 
are exceeded or informing displays that indicate the ACC’s behaviour relative to operating limits in real-time [27]. 
Information on function and intention, by making automation more reliable and predictable, promotes trust [28]. 
Further, feedback that informs of the automation’s behaviour in a variety of situations promotes improved mental 
model accuracy [7]. Taken together, feedback on the ACC’s purpose, process, and performance would support 
adequate understanding. However, in a visually-demanding, multi-task domain like driving, any provided feedback 
would need to be both peripheral and easily understood to avoid unintended distraction from the driving task.  
Increasingly automated vehicles, particularly those that relieve drivers of both lateral and longitudinal control 
tasks, may lead drivers to disengage from driving [29]. Initial studies on transfer of control indicate drivers may 
need at least seven seconds to resume control [30]. Informing drivers of an automated system’s behaviour and 
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conditions in which they may need to resume control is crucial for drivers to develop accurate mental models to 
enable timely interventions.  
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